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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DANIEL ALLEN TEMPLE, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
Case No. 14232 
-v- : 
SAMUEL W. SMITH, Warden, 
Utah State Prison, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant through a writ of habeas corpus 
challenged the validity of parole date rescission 
procedures employed when his unexecuted parole 
date was rescinded. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The petition for writ of habeas corpus 
was heard and argued before the Honorable Marcellus 
K. Snow, Third Judicial District Court. Judge 
Snow issued an order denying the writ and raade and 
entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmance of the judgment 
rendered by the lower court. 
- 1 ~ Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant is presently confined at the Utah 
State Prison. He was committed to the prison on 
December 1, 1969, pursuant to his conviction on two 
counts of grand larceny. 
On September 27, 1972, the Board of Pardons 
granted appellant a prospective parole release date 
of March 12, 19 74. This date was conditional upon 
appellant's appropriate conduct during the interim 
period• (Tr. pp. 29-30). 
On March 12, 1973, appellant was allowed 
to enter a drug rehabilitation program at Odyssey 
House. He disappeared from Odyssey House August 
27, 19 73. He was arrested November 7, 19 73, in 
El Paso, Texas for car theft. (letter from appellant 
to the Board of Pardons dated February 25, 1975). 
Appellant was examined by a psychiatrist, and 
admitted to the Texas State Mental Hospital under 
the name of Ed Temple. Appellant was discharged 
from the Texas State Hospital on April 27, 19 74, 
(more than a month after his previously granted 
parole date). Utah prison and parole officials 
were unaware of appellant's status or location be-
cause he was using the name Ed Temple. Appellant was 
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again arrested on June 11, 1974, and charged with 
escape from the Utah State Prison, suspicion of 
burglary, and burglary. Utah Correctional authori-
ties became aware of appellant's status as a result 
of the June 11, 19 74, arrest and he was returned 
to the Utah State Prison on January 30, 19 75. The 
charges in Texas for escape and burglary were dis-
missed against appellant when he was returned. 
Appellant appeared before the Board of 
Pardons on February 26, 1975, and his previously 
granted parole date was rescinded. In a letter 
prepared for the parole board dated February 25, 
19 75, appellant admitted his escape from Odyssey 
House and outlined his activities during the period 
of escape. Appellant did not request to present 
any witnesses or documentary evidence during his 
hearing, although such a request would have been 
honored by the parole board (Tr. p. 34, 11.6-13). 
Appellant petitioned for a writ of habeas 
corpus in July of 1975. The writ was denied by 
Judge Snow and appellant now appeals from that 
decision. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE RESCISSION OF AN UNEXECUTED PAROLE DATE 
IS NOT THE EQUIVALENT OF A PAROLE REVOCATION AND 
THE PROCEDURES EMPLOYED IN RESCINDING APPELLANT'S 
PAROLE DATE WERE THEREFORE VALID AND CONSTITUTIONAL, 
Appellant contends that the procedural 
protections necessary in a parole or probation hear-
ing, as elaborated in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 
471 (1972) and Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 
(19 73), should be extended to a parole date 
rescission hearing. There is no controlling case 
requiring the extension of Morrissey,, supra, 
and Gagnon, supra, beyond their particular facts, 
and we "therefore reject that contention. 
Morrissey was a case involving the revoca-
tion of parole. Gagnon dealt with the revocation 
of probation. In both situations, (parole and pro-
bation) one convicted of a crime is granted con-
siderable freedom outside of the prison facility. 
The revocation of that freedom is a drastic change 
in status for the parolee or probationer. Such a 
change may reasonably be considered a "grievous 
loss." 
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The instant case is far different from 
Morrissey and Gagnon. 
Here, appellant had been granted a condi-
tional parole date. He had no vested right in 
that date. He merely had a conditional promise 
that he could enjoy freedom outside the prison i^f 
he conducted himself in accord with the terms of 
the parole agreement. 
When the Board of Pardons rescinded appel-
lant' s parole date he was a duly incarcerated 
prisoner. His status was not altered by the ' 
rescission. His limited rights and freedom inside 
the prison were not diminished nor were any extra 
rights or freedom revoked. 
Appellant argues that because his parole 
date was rescinded after its effective date such 
rescission is, in effect, a parole revocation. 
(Appellant's Brief, page 6). Such a conclusion 
is not warranted by the facts. Appellant was 
simply not a parolee. He had never been placed 
on parole. The exact terms of his parole had 
not been defined. He had no parole officer. 
He did not have a legally sanctioned right to 
freedom outside the prison. 
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The court in Scarpa v. United States Board 
of Parole, 477 F.2d 278 (5th Cir. 1973) (dismissing 
a federal prisoner's complaint regarding parole 
board hearing procedures denying him a parole 
date) explained the difference between a potential 
parolee and one who enjoys the expanded rights of 
actual parole or probation: 
"Whether the Board grants 
parole is a clearly distinguish-
able exercise of discretion from 
revoking one's conditional 
freedom. . .Scarpa . . .attempts 
to equate the possibility of 
conditional freedom with the 
right to conditional freedom. 
We find such logic unacceptable." 
(p. 282) 
Even after the effective date of his parole 
release date appellant only had a possibility of 
conditional freedom. That freedom did not become 
operative merely because the predetermined release 
date passed. 
It is true that appellant's parole release 
date was rescinded after its effective date but 
an analysis of the facts of the present case indi-
cates that the actions of the Board of Pardons 
did not deny appellant due process of law. 
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Appellant disappeared from Odyssey House 
several months before the effective date of his 
parole. Appellant suggests (Appellant's Brief, p. 
8) that his release date could have been rescinded 
promptly after his disappearance. By the terms 
of appellant's parole agreement an immediate 
rescission would have been justified (Tr. pp. 29-30)• 
However, such a summary procedure would have been 
somewhat unfair because the prisoner himself would 
have been absent from the proceeding. In light 
of that unfairness the Board of Pardons waited 
until appellant had returned to prison before 
a rescission hearing was held. Appellant admitted 
his escape in a letter to the Board before the 
hearing and did not request to offer any evidence 
at the hearing. The terms of appellant's parole 
agreement became null and void as a result of his 
admission and yet the Board still allowed him the 
opportunity of a hearing. 
The net effect of appellant's written 
admission of escape coupled with the self-executing 
terms of his prospective parole release agreement 
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was to obviate the need for a formal "finding" by 
the Board concerning his escape. 
In light of the above facts it is submitted 
that the action by the Board of Pardons was a parole 
date rescission hearing not a parole revocation 
hearing and coraported with due process requirements 
for parole rescission proceedings. 
POINT II 
THE PROCEDURES USED IN RESCINDING APPEL-
LANT ' S PAROLE DATE WERE CONSTITUTIONAL AND MORE 
RIGOROUS DUE PROCESS STANDARDS THAN THOSE 
AFFORDED APPELLANT ARE NOT REQUIRED. 
No cases controlling in Utah have extended 
the due process requirements of Morrissey, supra_, 
and Gagnon, supra, to parole date rescission hear-
ings. 
While some of the cases cited by appellant 
appear at first reading to suggest the extension 
°f Morrissey and Gagnon standards to parole 
rescission hearings, a close reading of the cases 
reveals important differences between them and 
the present case. 
Appellant cites Batchelder v. Kenten, 
383 F.Supp. 299 (CD. Calif. 1974), as the case 
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most similar in fact and principle to the instant 
case. In Batchelder, however, the petitioner 
suffered a parole date rescission but also was 
transferred to a more secure institution. The 
rescission plus the change in status was held by 
that particular court to be a significant 'grievous 
loss1' which broughtMorrissey into play. No 
change of status occurred in the present case. 
In fact, appellant was given a new parole date 
despite his fifteen month absence. 
In re Prewitt, 105 Cal.Rptr. 318, 503 
P.2d 1326 (1972), is cited for the extension of 
Morrissey, but there petitioner not only lost a 
potential release date but was denied future 
possibility of parole. This denial of future parole 
was based on information submitted by lav; enforce-
ment agencies which had investigated petitioner's 
case. The loss suffered by Prewitt (rescission 
of parole and denial of possibility of future 
parole) was greater than in the present case and 
the actions of the California Adult Authority were 
very similar to a sentencing proceeding where 
considerable due process protections are afforded. 
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I n
 Means v. Wainwright, 299 So.2d 577 
(Fla. 1974, U.S. cert, den., 419 U.S. 1116), the 
Florida Court ordered Morrissey standards for 
parole rescission hearings after a petitionees 
parole release date was summarily rescinded 
without a hearing. The Court in Means seemed 
to be imposing Morrissey requirements to fill the 
procedural gap which existed because the Florida 
correctional authority had failed to provide 
even minimum due process protections. In contrast, 
the Utah Board of Pardons provides considerable 
due process safeguards in its parole grant and 
parole rescission hearings, obviating the need for 
judicial imposition of due process limits in the 
present case. 
Appellant maintains that even if Morrissey-
Gagnon standards don't apply in the present case 
a lesser but considerable degree of due process 
is "mandated" in Utah but was not afforded to 
appellant. 
Respondent submits that the above conclu-
sion is erroneous. The cases cited by appellant 
which impose limited but substantial due process 
on parole rescission hearings are not controlling 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
in Utah and are distinguishable from the present 
case* 
In Lepre v. Butler, 394 F. Supp. 185 
(E.D. Pa. 1975) a prisoner's parole release date 
was rescinded without notice or hearing after 
the release date had expired but while the prisoner 
was still incarcerated. The court here like the court 
in Means v. Wainwright, supra, seeirs to be filling 
a procedural gap created by the state correctional 
system's failure to grant a hearing. 
The instant case is far different. Appellant 
was not in custody when his parole date came due; 
he was an escapee. The Board of Pardons waited 
for his return and then conducted a hearing, of 
which appellant had notice. 
I n
 Karger v. Sigler, 384 F. Supp. 10 
(D.Mass. 1974) the United States Board of Parole 
contravened its own rules by rescinding petitioner's 
parole date solely on the basis of a previous hearing. 
The court in Karger only mandated notice and hear-
ing for a rescission proceeding and expressly 
rejected the necessity of counsel, the right to 
present witnesses and documentary evidence, and 
the opportunity to cross-examine adverse witnesses. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
There are important differences between Karger 
and the present case. Appellant is not a federal 
prisoner* The Board of Pardons waived the oppor-
tunity to rescind appellant1s date while he was 
an escapee, which was possible under the terms of 
the parole grant agreement. Appellant did have 
a hearing, with notice corce^ning the rescission 
of his parole date. 
Godfrey v. Preiser, 80 Misc. 2d 361, 363 N.Y.S. 
2d 463 (1975), is distinguished, like Batchelder, 
supra, because the grievous loss suffered by 
Godfrey was confinement at a more secuie institution 
(Attica) plus the rescission of his parole date. 
No transfer occurred in the instant case* 
Jackson v. Wise, 390 F.Supp. 17 (CD. 
Calif. 1975), involved a federal prisoner whose 
parole release date was rescinded solely on the 
incident reports from the prison without an 
independent investigation. 
In the case now before the court, appellant's 
parole date was rescinded largely on the basis of 
his own admission of misconduct in a letter to the 
parole board. Moreover, the hearing afforded 
appellant the opportunity to present additional 
or mitigating evidence. 
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It should be noted that both Lepre, supra, 
an(3 Jackson, supra, may be moot and therefore value-
less for precedential purposes. 
Appellant suggests that the due process 
standards suggested by some courts for the granting 
of a parole release date or the standards of Wolff 
v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), concerning 
prison disciplinary proceedings should apply to 
parole rescission hearings. 
These views are unsupported by controlling 
case lav/ and respondent submits that the approach 
of the court in Sexton v. Wise, 494 F.2d 1176 
(5th Cir. 1974) , which deals with the summary 
rescission of parole dates, which is the situation 
in the present case, is sensible and instructive. 
The court in Sexton unequivocally states 
that: 
"Until a parole is finalized, 
no constitutional protections associ-
ated with a parole revocation embrace 
the intended parole.11 (p. 1178) 
(Emphasis added.) 
The Sexton court approved the rescission 
of a parole release grant to a federal prisoner which 
occurred without a hearing or notice, reasoning: 
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"That until final release 
occurs, the Board does not 
relinquish its broad discre-
tionary powers to rescind any 
future parole." 
There is no case requiring the imposition 
o f
 Morrissey, Wolff or parole grant due process 
standards on a parole rescission hearing. Appel-
lant was given a hearing within a meaningful time 
after his return to custody. He had an opportunity 
to explain his escape or present evidence and 
witnesses (time being provided for their acquisi-
tion) . The decision and action of the Board of 
Pardons were fair and complied with the due pro-
cess clause of the United States Consitution. 
POINT III 
APPELLANTfS PAROLE RELEASE DATE COULD BE 
RESCINDED SUBSEQUENT TO ITS EFFECTIVE DATE. 
Appellant's parole release date was offi-
cially rescinded within a month after he returned 
to custody following a period of escape of 
approximately eighteen months. As has been 
mentioned the terms of appellantfs prospective 
parole date grant agreement were self-executing 
and became null and void without a "rescission" 
whenever appellant violated a rule or refused to 
perform an assigned duty of the prison (Tr. pp. 
29-30). 
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Despite the self-executing, permissive 
language of the parole grant agreement the Board 
of Pardons waited until appellant could physically 
attend a rescission hearing before any action 
rescinding his unexecuted parole date was taken. 
The logical extension of appellants 
argument that the Board had no authority to 
rescind an unexecuted parole date once it passed 
suggests interesting consequences. All prisoners 
with future parole dates could escape before their 
parole dates became effective and if the prisoner 
were not recaptured before the effective date of 
the parole grant agreements they could demand parole 
revocation hearings (as opposed to parole date res-
cission hearings) because of their illegal absence. 
The alternative suggested by appellant, 
rescission without the presence of the prisoner, 
would not be as fair as the procedures used by the 
Board. The Board of Pardons did what was reasonable 
and fair in the present situation. It allowed 
appellant to attend the rescission hearing and 
explain his actions. It then rescinded an already 
void, unexecuted parole date and granted appellant 
a future date. To require more of the Board under 
the circumstances is contrary to common sense. 
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POINT IV 
THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW ENTERED BY THE TRIAL COURT ARE SUPPORTED BY 
THE RECORD AND ESPECIALLY WHEN VIEWED LIBERALLY 
IN SUPPORT OF THE JUDGMENT DO NOT CONSTITUTE 
REVERSIBLE ERROR. 
Appellant submits five points which appeared 
in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
as error demanding reversal in the instant case. 
We reject appellant's contention as being 
conclusionary and unsupported by any precedent. 
The claimed erroneous Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law are: 
" (1) The rescission of the parole date 
was based upon the ground that appel-
lant had been an escapee at the time 
of the effective date of his parole 
(Findings of Fact, paragraph 6); 
(2) The rescission of appellant's parole 
release date by the Board of Pardons 
was proper and in accordance with law 
(Findings of Fact, paragraph 13); 
(3) The rescission was proper and 
in accordance with law and did not 
deprive appellant of his constitu-
tional right to due process of 
law in that Morrissey and Gagnon, 
supra, are inapplicable to res-
cission of parole release date hear-
ings and appellant self-induced the 
delay of the rescission hearing by 
being on escapee status when his 
parole date came due (Conclusions 
of Law, paragraph 3); 
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(4) There have been no errors or 
infringements of appellant's 
constitutional rights because 
appellant pleaded guilty at 
the parole rescission hearing 
(Conclusions of Law, paragraph 
4); 
(5) Appellant's incarceration is 
legal (Conclusions of lav; para-
graph 5) ." 
As to the first point. Respondent submitted 
into evidence a letter from appellant to the Board 
of Pardons in which he admitted escaping from 
Odyssey House (T.10, attached letter), and chronicled 
his activities until his return to the Utah State 
Prison. There is no requirement (statutory or 
otherwise) that a prisoner be given the reasons 
for a parole date rescission. 
As to the second, third and fifth points 
going to the legality of the rescission all of 
appellant's citations of error are based on unwar-
ranted and conclusory assumptions about the parole 
rescission procedure in Utah. 
It appears from the record that 1) appel-
lant wrote to the Board of Pardons concerning his 
escape a day before his rescission hearing (Tr. p. 10). 
2) Appellant did not present witnesses or evidence. 
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He could have, but did not request to do so 
(Tr. p. 30-31). It is not established in Utah nor 
suggested by the United States Supreme Court that 
assistance of counsel or confrontation of witnesses 
is required in parole rescission hearings. Nor are 
findings by the Board required to be furnished 
to the prisoner, nor is a preliminary hearing on the 
question of probable cause mandated in Utah or in 
federal courts for parole date rescission hearings. 
The trial courtfs findings on all of the 
above matters was in complete accord with the lav/ 
in Utah. 
As to the remainder of the third point. 
Appellant has failed to present a single case 
which requires the extension of Morrissey and 
Gagnon due process standards to parole rescission 
hearings. 
As to the fourth point, appellant admitted 
his escape in a letter to the Board of Pardons 
(Tr. p.10). It should be noted that the Board of 
Pardons is not a judicial tribunal. It is a dis-
cretionary, administrative body. Proceedings 
before it do not require judicial standards of due 
process or submission of evidence. It is entirely 
within the discretion of the Board to consider 
evidence given to it by prisoners and prison officials. 
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The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Lav; entered by the trial court were in accord 
v/itb the law in Utah concerning parole rescission 
procedures. 
CONCLUSION 
The procedures employed in rescinding 
appellant's unexecuted parole date were fair and 
constitutional. There are no cases which require 
the extension of Morrissey, Gagnon, or Wolff due 
process safeguards to parole date rescission 
hearings. The Findings and Conclusions of the 
trial court are consistent with the record and 
reveal no reversible deficiencies. 
If this Court should find some reversible 
error, however, respondent submits that the appropri-
ate remedy would be to allow the Board of Pardons 
to give appellant a rescission hearing in compliance 
with standards enunciated by this court. This 
provision for a new hearing as the appropriate 
remedy was allowed in Karger, supra. 
In light of the facts of this case and 
the arguments presented above, respondent submits 
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that the decision of the court below was correct 
and should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
EARL F. DORIUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
I 
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